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Abstract
Purpose – This paper documents a strong violation of the law of one price surrounding a large rights issue.
Design/methodology/approach – If prices are right, the relation between the prices of shares and rights
follows the outcome of a simple calculation.
Findings – In the case of Royal Imtech N.V. in 2014, prices deviated sharply and persistently from the
theoretical prediction. Throughout the term of the rights, investors were buying shares at prices that were
many times what they should have been given the price of the rights. Short-selling constraints in the form of
high recall risk and lacking stock lending supply are themost likely explanation for the failure of arbitrage as a
safeguard of market efficiency. Still, it remains remarkable that investors were buying large volumes of shares
at highly inflated prices in the presence of a cheap, perfect substitute.
Originality/value – The mispricing was special not just because of its severity but also because unlike
previously documented cases there was no fundamental risk and no material noise trader risk.
Keywords Law of one price, Market efficiency, Mispricing, Limits to arbitrage, Short-sale constraints
Paper type Case study
1. Introduction
Under the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) “prices are right”: a security’s price reflects its
fundamental value, the risk-adjusted present value of its future cash flows. Market efficiency
is important because it helps to ensure the optimal allocation of scarce capital. The key
concept underlying the idea of market efficiency is arbitrage. When there is mispricing,
arbitrageurs buy and sell the same or essentially similar securities at advantageously
different prices and as a result push prices back to the fundamental value (Friedman, 1953;
Fama, 1965).
The textbook version of arbitrage entails no risk or other impediments. Real-world
arbitrage, however, normally does entail risks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 2000;
Gromb and Vayanos, 2010; Barberis, 2018). First, arbitrageurs often face fundamental risk
because securities are rarely perfectly identical. Second, even if perfect substitutes exist,
arbitrageurs are generally still exposed to the risk that the mispricing increases. This so-
called noise trader risk may force arbitrageurs to liquidate their position early at a loss (De
Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Third, arbitrageurs are exposed to the risk that
borrowed stock is being recalled by the lender and that lending fees go up, which brings
additional costs and can lead to early liquidation (Lamont, 2004; Engelberg et al., 2018). In
addition, real-world arbitrage comes with implementation issues in the form of, for example,
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transaction costs, information costs, stock loan fees and sometimes lacking stock lending
supply (Saffi and Sigurdsson, 2011; Boehmer and Wu, 2013). As a result of these limits to
arbitrage, mispricings can occur and persist.
The assessment of whether assets are correctly priced is difficult, because fundamental
values are generally unobservable (Fama, 1970, 1991). There is, however, one basic
implication of market efficiency that can be tested directly without knowledge of
fundamental values: the law of one price, according to which identical assets should have
identical prices. Violations of the law of one price have been observed in studies of twin stocks
(Rosenthal and Young, 1990; Froot and Dabora, 1999; De Jong et al., 2009), cross-listings
(Grossmann et al., 2007; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010), closed-end mutual funds (Lee et al., 1990,
1991) and parent companies (Cornell and Liu, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2002; Lamont and
Thaler, 2003a).
The present paper adds to this literature by documenting a clear, persistent and
unprecedentedly strong violation of the law of one price that took place at the time of a large
rights issue. Throughout the term of the rights, investors were buying large numbers of shares
at prices that were many times what they should have been given the price of the rights. The
mispricing was special not just because of its severity, but also because unlike previously
documented cases there was no fundamental risk and no material noise trader risk.
In 2014, the Dutch technical services company Royal Imtech N.V. (henceforth: Imtech)
implemented a rights issue to reduce its pressing debt burden and improve its liquidity. For
each share held at the close of trading onOctober 8, shareholders received the right to purchase
131 additional shares at a heavily discounted price. Holders of the rights could subscribe for the
new shares until the close of trading on October 22. During the subscription period the rights
were publicly traded for nine days, separately from the shares.
Under the law of one price, the relation between the price of the shares and the price of the
rights should follow the outcome of a simple calculation. We show that the prices of the two
securities deviated sharply from this theoretical prediction. On October 9, for example, the
closing price of the shares was more than nine times what it should have been given the price
of the rights at that time. The discrepancy decreased over time, but did not disappear and
remained large. After one week of trading, for example, the shares were still changing hands
at 3.75 times the value implied by the rights.
At first sight, this mispricing provided a lucrative arbitrage opportunity: an investor could
buy one right and simultaneously short 131 shares. This strategy would have been devoid of
fundamental risk and would have entailed barely any noise trader risk, because the rights were
convertible into shareswith adelay of atmost about twoweeks.The spectacularmispricing could
most likely occur and persist because of frictions in the stock lending market. The arbitrage
strategy required a share-to-right ratio of 131:1, whereas the ratio of outstanding shares and
rights in the market was only 1:1 at the time the two securities were simultaneously traded.
A shortage of shares that can be borrowed makes short selling difficult to implement and risky.
Miller (1977) already described how short-sale constraints can prevent negative
information from being reflected in stock prices. Short-sale constraints, however, are not a
sufficient condition for violations of the law of one price to occur (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1987). For mispricing it is necessary that some investors are buying the expensive security or
selling the cheap one, for example (1) because they are forced to do so in response to a margin
call or a recall of borrowed shares, (2) because they speculate that the price discrepancy will
increase in the short run or (3) because they fail to see that the two securities are identical
(Lamont and Thaler, 2003b). In the case of Imtech, investors were indeed buying large
volumes of shares at highly inflated prices while a cheap alternative was available to them.
The following sections describe the details of the rights issue (Section 2), demonstrate the
mispricing (Section 3), discuss the case and possible explanations (Section 4) and conclude
(Section 5).
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2. The Imtech rights issue
A rights issue is a way by which a listed company can raise additional capital. The company
grants its shareholders the right to buy new shares in proportion to the number of shares they
already hold, at a predetermined discounted price on a predetermined date in the near future.
The rights are generally transferable and publicly traded until the expiry date. Holders of the
rights can subscribe for the new shares within a fixed time period. If all shareholders exercise
their rights or sell them in an efficient market, the method avoids the wealth transfer from
existing to new shareholders that typically occurs with standard seasoned equity offerings
(Holderness and Pontiff, 2016).
Imtech was an established Dutch technical services provider in the fields of electrical and
mechanical engineering and automation. The company’s shares were listed on Euronext in
Amsterdam. In its peak years, shortly before its collapse, Imtech had approximately 30,000
employees and reported annual revenues of about V5 billion. In 2013, the company discovered
that its activities in Germany and Poland were subject to extensive corruption and accounting
fraud. These discoveries marked the start of a two-year period of financial distress and
reorganizations. In these two years, Imtech completed two rights issues totaling V1.1 billion to
reduce its pressing debt burden and improve its liquidity. The companywas eventually declared
bankrupt in August 2015 and delisted in January 2017.
Themispricing case pertains to the second rights issue, which was implemented in the fall
of 2014. The details of the offering were announced on October 8, 2014. For each share held at
the close of trading on Euronext in Amsterdam on October 8, shareholders received the right
to purchase 131 additional shares at an issue price of V0.01 each. The subscription period
lasted until the close of trading on October 22. With the exception of the last day of the
subscription period, the rights were publicly traded. The new shares were assigned on
October 24 and became listed and tradable onOctober 27. To increase the nominal price of the
shares, a 500-to-1 reverse stock split was announced along with the rights issue and
implemented before the start of trading on October 28. The rights issue was underwritten by
ING, Rabobank, Commerzbank and ABNAmro. Because holders of the rights subscribed for
only 52.44 percent of the issue, the four banks had to take up nearly half of the new shares.
Prior to the rights issue, the number of Imtech shares outstanding was 458,642,404. The issue
of 60,082,154,924 new shares generated approximately V600 million in gross proceeds and
V567 million in net proceeds.
For our main analysis we use price and trading data that are publicly available on the
website of Euronext [1]. Throughout the entire period of interest, the tick size of the shares
and the rights wasV0.0001. Figure 1 summarizes the development of the prices and trading
volumes of Imtech’s shares and rights for the period October 2–22, 2014. On October 8, the
day of the announcement of the details of the rights offering, Imtech’s share price dropped
fromV0.3763 toV0.3200. Apparently, the rights offering, and especially its size and apparent
urgency, was seen as a negative signal about the financial position of the company.
Throughout the following days, after every share had been converted into a share and a right,
the decline continued at a steady pace. At the close of trading on October 21, the sum of the
price of a share and the price of a right was down to a mereV0.0166, corresponding to a post-
issue market capitalization of V1.0 billion.
Intraday volatility was high, especially during the first few ex-right days. On October 9,
for example, the shares opened atV0.0300, closed atV0.1000 and reached high and lowprices
of V0.2530 and V0.0256 in between. A notable day for the rights was October 10, when the
price in the very first minute of trading collapsed to V0.0010 and then rebounded
immediately. Both the shares and the rights were actively traded, with the daily volume of the
shares sometimes even approaching (October 9) or exceeding (October 22) the number of
shares that were outstanding. In monetary terms, the average daily value of trading was
V10.7 million for the shares and V2.0 million for the rights.












































































































Note(s): The figure shows the daily closing prices (top chart), intraday price movements
(candlestick charts; intraday up gray, intraday down black) and daily trading volumes
(bar charts) of Imtech shares and rights for the period October 2–22, 2014. Prices are in






At the close of trading on October 8, the theoretical ex-rights price (TERP) of the shares was
V0.0123. This value equals the price of one existing share (V0.3200) plus the proceeds from
the issue of 131 new shares (V1.3100), divided by the number of shares per existing share in
the new situation (132).
The second column of Table 1 lists the actual closing prices of Imtech shares for each of
the nine days on which both the shares and the rights were traded. On October 9, the shares
closed at V0.1000, which is considerably higher than the expected TERP of V0.0123.
Assuming that this surprisingly high share price was correct, we can calculate the
theoretical price of the rights for the same point in time. Denoting the actual price of the shares
by S, the implied price of the rights R is given by 1313ðS − 0:0100Þ [2]. Column three and
column five of Table 1 list the actual closing prices R and the theoretical closing prices R of
the right. Given the share price ofV0.1000 on October 9, the theoretical price of the rights was
V11.790. In reality, however, the rights changed hands at V0.1340.
If we instead assume that the price of the rights was correct, the theoretical price of the
shares S is given by ðR þ 13130:0100Þ=131. Column four shows the implied closing prices
of the shares. Given the actual closing price of the rights of V0.1340, the shares should have
been worthV0.0110 on October 9. In contrast, the shares closed atV0.1000 that day, which is
807% higher than the theoretical price. The differences between the actual and theoretical
prices signify dramatic mispricing.
In theory, an arbitrageur could exploit the mispricing by buying one right and
simultaneously shorting 131 shares. On October 9, she would then receive the difference of
V12.97 [3]. Upon completion of the rights issue, she closes her position by exchanging the
right for 131 shares at a total price ofV1.31. Ignoring costs, her net profit from this strategy
would beV11.66 [4]. Because the rights were convertible into shares and because the strategy
would take nomore than a few days, the arbitrageur would bear neither fundamental nor any
material noise trader risk.
The prices of the shares and the rights remained incompatible throughout the subsequent
eight days the two securities were simultaneously traded. As shown in column six of Table 1,
the ratio of the actual and the theoretical price of the shares decreased over time but remained
large. For instance, after a full week of trading, on October 15, the share price was at 3.75
times the price implied by the rights. On October 21, when the final trades in the right took
place, this ratio was still a non-negligible 1.65 [5].
The mispricing was not limited to closing prices. Figure 2 shows the minute-by-minute
evolution of bid and ask prices for each of the nine trading days. The width of the patterns in
black represents the size of the interval between the lowest best bid price and the highest best ask
Date S R S R S=S R=R A
9 Oct 0.1000 0.1340 0.0110 11.790 9.07 0.011 11.66
10 Oct 0.0900 0.1390 0.0111 10.480 8.14 0.013 10.34
13 Oct 0.0502 0.1000 0.0108 5.266 4.66 0.019 5.17
14 Oct 0.0363 0.0300 0.0102 3.445 3.55 0.009 3.42
15 Oct 0.0384 0.0331 0.0103 3.720 3.75 0.009 3.69
16 Oct 0.0354 0.0300 0.0102 3.327 3.46 0.009 3.30
17 Oct 0.0262 0.0210 0.0102 2.122 2.58 0.010 2.10
20 Oct 0.0211 0.0107 0.0101 1.454 2.09 0.007 1.44
21 Oct 0.0165 0.0010 0.0100 0.852 1.65 0.001 0.85
Note(s): The table shows the actual closing price of the shares (S) and of the rights (R), the implied closing price
of the shares ðSÞand of the rights ðRÞ, the ratio of the actual price and the implied price for the shares ðS=SÞ
and for the rights ðR=RÞ and the arbitrage gain from long in one right and short in 131 shares (A)
Table 1.
Actual and theoretical
closing prices (in euro)
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price of the shares. Thewidth of the patterns in gray shows the theoretical counterpart, that is, the
size of the interval of share prices implied by the lowest best bid price and the highest best ask
price of the rights. The widths thus represent upper bounds of the actual and implied real-time
bid-ask spreadswithin a givenminute, and all transactions in the shares and the rights took place
at prices within these intervals. Because the share prices implied by the bid and ask prices of the
rights are always onlymarginally aboveV0.01 (the exercise price of the rights), the gray patterns
visually resemble flat lines atV0.01. Clearly, the mispricing was constantly present throughout






















































Note(s): On a minute-by-minute basis and for each of the nine trading days in the period of
interest (October 9–21, 2014), the figure plots the intraday development of the lowest best bid
price, the highest best ask price and the interval between these for the Imtech shares (“actual”;
in black) and the share prices implied by the lowest best bid price, the highest best ask price
and the interval between these for the Imtech rights (“theoretical”; in gray). The widths of the
patterns thus represent upper bounds of the actual and implied real-time bid-ask spreads
within a given minute. For the sake of visibility, the latter (gray) series are displayed thicker
than the true implied widths. Prices are in euro, times are local times in Amsterdam
Figure 2.
Actual and theoretical
intraday bid and ask
prices of the shares
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around noon on October 9, investors were bidding for the shares at a price that corresponded to
approximately 22 times the price implied by the ask price of the rights.
The high daily trading volumes shown in Figure 1 already indicated that the mispricing
cannot be explained by low intraday liquidity. The small widths of the black and gray
patterns in Figure 2 confirm that the bid-ask spreads and intra-minute volatilities of the
shares and the rights were always negligible as compared to the size of the mispricing [6].
Additionally, minute-by-minute data on volumes and numbers of trades show that both
securities were actively traded throughout every entire trading day. In theory, therefore,
extensive and highly profitable arbitrage could have taken place during the nine days.
4. Discussion
Although we cannot give a conclusive answer as to whether either the shares or the rights (or
both) were mispriced, it is most likely that the shares were overvalued. Just before ex-right
trading, Imtech’s share price and number of outstanding shares corresponded to a market
capitalization of approximatelyV150million. At the close of the next day, after the rights had
been assigned and traded separately, the share price implied that Imtech’s equity would be
worth more than V6 billion after the completion of the V600 million issue. Such a valuation
would be implausibly high for a troubled company that generated about V5 billion in
revenues in its peak years, and such an overnight increase would have been unprecedented.
Furthermore, throughout the first few months after the rights offering and the 500-to-1
reverse stock split, the prices of Imtech shares were within a range of about V3.40–V5.30.
This range includes the post-reverse-split equivalents of the prices implied by the prices of the
rights and is far off from the reverse-split adjusted prices of the shares.
The Imtech case is not the first case that is at oddswith the notion of efficientmarkets. The
degree of mispricing in the Imtech case, however, was of an unprecedented size, with a
persistent overvaluation of the shares relative to the rights of hundreds of percentage points.
What also makes the Imtech case unique is that short-selling constraints were the only
plausible impediment to arbitrage. In the well-known twin-stock case of Royal Dutch and
Shell, for example, arbitrageurs faced significant noise trader risk. In the carve-out case of
Palm-3Com they arguably faced the fundamental risk that the full spin-off of the subsidiary
would not occur (Cherkes et al., 2013). With Imtech, there was no fundamental risk and no
material noise trader risk, because the rights could be converted into shares within a time
frame of at most about two weeks. Also, given the magnitude of the mispricing and the
combination of negligibly small bid-ask spreads, small tick sizes, low intra-minute volatilities
and high trading volumes, it is unlikely that transaction costs or other market microstructure
aspects were material obstacles to arbitrage.
One short-selling constraint that allowed themispricing to occur and persist was probably
a lack of available shares. Arbitrage required a share-to-right ratio of 131:1, whereas the ratio
of outstanding shares and rights in the market was only 1:1 [7]. The other likely impediment
to short selling was high recall risk, resulting in reluctance among traders to speculate
against the stock. Borrowed stock can be recalled at any time by the lender, and if this
happens the arbitrageur is forced to close her position if she cannot find a new lender
(Lamont, 2004). In the case of Imtech, any smart trader—favored or lucky enough to have
access to a stock loan—will have understood that the chance of recall was high, because a
lender becoming aware of the overvaluation would want to quickly recall the shares in order
to sell them. Finding a new lender would then be difficult, and the resulting forced liquidation
could easily leave her with large losses.
These two short-selling constraints can explain why insufficient attentive investors were
entering the market to push the price of the shares down. Still, it remains remarkable that
others were buying large volumes of shares at highly inflated prices in the presence of a
cheap, perfect substitute. A small part of the explanation could be that short-sellers were
A case of 807
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forced to buy the shares in response to the recall of previously borrowed shares [8]. A related
partial explanation, put forward in personal conversations that we had with three (former)
professional traders, could be that speculators were buying shares and then withdrawing
these from the lending market in anticipation of—and to increase the likelihood of—a short
squeeze, where the share price would spike due to price pressure from intraday short-sellers
unable to rollover and forced to unwind their positions. The price developments on October 9
and perhaps October 10 (see Figure 2) may reflect such a short squeeze. Other possible
explanations for why people were buying the shares and not the rights include inattention
(unawareness of the cheap alternative), financial illiteracy (poor understanding of rights) and
familiarity bias (a preference for the familiar shares over the unfamiliar rights).
5. Conclusion
In the present paper we have documented a clear and unprecedentedly strong violation of the
law of one price. During nine trading days surrounding a large rights issue, the prices of the
shares of Royal Imtech N.V. were between 1.6 and 22 times what they should have been given
the prices of the rights. The failure of arbitrage as a safeguard of market efficiency appears to
be almost exclusively attributable to short-selling constraints in the form of limited stock
lending supply and recall risk.
This case of blatant mispricing in a modern stock market underlines that the efficiency of
security prices cannot be taken for granted. In a frictionless world with arbitrageurs constantly
monitoringmarkets, any occurrence ofmispricingwill be only small and short-lived. In the real
world, however, impediments to arbitrage can allow prices to deviate sharply and persistently
from their fundamental values, even if the mispricing is evident and easy to detect.
Notes
1. Shares: www.euronext.com/en/products/equities/NL0006055329-XAMS. Rights: www.euronext.
com/en/products/equities/NL0010886883-XAMS.
2. For simplicity we assume that the time value of the rights is zero. This assumption is reasonable in
the light of the short time to maturity and the high moneyness of the rights. With a positive time
value, the reported mispricing would be even stronger.
3. Closing prices of the two securities were established through a closing auction at 17:30. The trades
would therefore occur at precisely the same time.
4. This is the minimum profit of the strategy. If the share price would drop below the issue price of
V0.01 she could instead undo her short position by buying 131 shares in the market for less
than V1.31.
5. A risky alternative to arbitrage was to buy rights on the last trading day (October 21), exercise these
and sell the acquired shares on the market once these were listed and tradable (October 27). Clearly,
such a naked strategywas notwithout risk given the huge size of the share issue and the likelihood of
similar intentions of other investors and would—with hindsight—not have worked because the
share price fell from V0.0165 (close October 21) to V0.0089 (close October 27).
6. The daily average minute-by-minute difference between the highest best ask price and the lowest
best bid price was between V0.00033 (October 21) and V0.00516 (October 9) for the shares and
between V0.00040 (October 21) and V0.00635 (October 9) for the rights.
7. In reality, the ratio of shares available in the lendingmarket to the number of outstanding rights was
even worse than 1:1, because not all share holdings fall within the scope of a share lending program.
8. According to the prospectus, there were six holders of net short positions of at least 0.5% on
September 30, for a total of 8.09% of the company’s share capital (p. 169). Because of the reporting
threshold of 0.5%, the number and size of smaller short positions is unknown. The net short
positions register of the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) indicates that the short
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interest declined sharply during the nine trading days of interest. Regardless of the exact overall
short interest and even in the extreme case that all short positionswere closed out, short covering can
account for only a small part of the total trading volume.
References
Barberis, N. (2018), “Psychology-based models of asset prices and trading volume”, in Bernheim, B.D.,
DellaVigna, S. and Laibson, D. (Eds), Handbook of Behavioral Economics - Foundations and
Applications 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 79-175.
Boehmer, E. and Wu, J.J. (2013), “Short selling and the price discovery process”, Review of Financial
Studies, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 287-322.
Cherkes, M., Jones, C.M. and Spatt, C.S. (2013), “A Solution to The Palm-3 com Spin-Off Puzzles”,
Working paper.
Cornell, B. and Liu, Q. (2001), “The parent company puzzle: when is the whole worth less than one of
the parts?”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 341-366.
De Jong, A., Rosenthal, L. and Van Dijk, M.A. (2009), “The risk and return of arbitrage in dual-listed
companies”, Review of Finance, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 495-520.
De Long, J.B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H. and Waldmann, R.J. (1990), “Noise trader risk in financial
markets”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 No. 4, pp. 703-738.
Diamond, D.W. and Verrecchia, R.E. (1987), “Constraints on short-selling and asset price adjustment
to private information”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 277-311.
Engelberg, J.E., Reed, A.V. and Ringgenberg, M.C. (2018), “Short-selling risk”, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 73 No. 2, pp. 755-786.
Fama, E.F. (1965), “The behavior of stock-market prices”, Journal of Business, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 34-105.
Fama, E.F. (1970), “Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work”, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 383-417.
Fama, E.F. (1991), “Efficient capital markets: II”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46 No. 5, pp. 1575-1617.
Friedman, M. (1953), “The case for flexible exchange rates”, Essays in Positive Economics, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 157-203.
Froot, K.A. and Dabora, E.M. (1999), “How are stock prices affected by the location of trade?”, Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 53 No. 2, pp. 189-216.
Gagnon, L. and Karolyi, G.A. (2010), “Multi-market trading and arbitrage”, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 97 No. 1, pp. 53-80.
Gromb, D. and Vayanos, D. (2010), “Limits of arbitrage”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 2
No. 1, pp. 251-275.
Grossmann, A., Ozuna, T. and Simpson, M.W. (2007), “ADR mispricing: do costly arbitrage and
consumer sentiment explain the price deviation?”, Journal of International Financial Markets,
Institutions and Money, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 361-371.
Holderness, C.G. and Pontiff, J. (2016), “Shareholder nonparticipation in valuable rights offerings: new
findings for an old puzzle”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 120 No. 2, pp. 252-268.
Lamont, O.A. (2004), “Short sale constraints and overpricing”, in Fabozzi, F.J. (Ed.), Short Selling:
Strategies, Risks, and Rewards, John Wiley & Sons, pp. 179-203.
Lamont, O.A. and Thaler, R.H. (2003a), “Can the market add and subtract? mispricing in tech stock
carve-outs”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111 No. 2, pp. 227-268.
Lamont, O.A. and Thaler, R.H. (2003b), “Anomalies: the law of one price in financial markets”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 191-202.
Lee, C.M.C., Shleifer, A. and Thaler, R.H. (1990), “Anomalies: closed-end mutual funds”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 153-164.
A case of 807
percent
mispricing
Lee, C.M.C., Shleifer, A. and Thaler, R.H. (1991), “Investor sentiment and the closed-end fund puzzle”,
Journal of Finance, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 75-109.
Miller, E.M. (1977), “Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 32 No. 4,
pp. 1151-1168.
Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T. and Stafford, E. (2002), “Limited arbitrage in equity markets”, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 57 No. 2, pp. 551-584.
Rosenthal, L. and Young, C. (1990), “The seemingly anomalous price behavior of royal Dutch/shell and
unilever N.V./PLC”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 123-141.
Saffi, P.A.C. and Sigurdsson, K. (2011), “Price efficiency and short selling”, Review of Financial Studies,
Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 821-852.
Shleifer, A. (2000), Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), “The limits of arbitrage”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 1,
pp. 35-55.
Corresponding author
Martijn J. van den Assem can be contacted at: m.j.vanden.assem@vu.nl
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
RBF
